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Defendants/Appellees.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)( j) .

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether former Commissioners of Financial

Institutions W. Smoot Brimhall and Mirvin D. Borthick, in the
discharge of their statutory responsibilities, owed a duty of
care to appellants individually on which a cause of action for
gross negligence can be based.
Since the existence of an actionable legal duty is a
question of law, no deference is accorded to the decision below
on this issue.

Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989).

2.

Whether Borthick and Brimhall are entitled to good

faith immunity.
The standard of review for this issue is that the court
accords no deference to the ruling below.

The issue was decided

on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and that kind of
motion involves no factual determination which would justify
deference to a trail court's decision.

See 5A C. Wright, A.

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1368 (2d ed. 1990).
3.

Whether appellants' claim of gross negligence

against former Commissioner of Financial Institutions, W. Smoot
Brimhall is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Since this issue presents only a conclusion of law, no
deference is accorded to the decision below.

Madsen II, 769 P.2d

245, 247 (Utah 1988) .
4.

Whether the trial court properly refused to certify

this lawsuit as a class action.
Since class action certification is committed to the
discretion of the trial court, the standard of review for this
issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
class certification.

See Anderson v. City of Albequerques, 690

F.2d 796, 799 (10th Cir. 1982).

STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION
IS DETERMINATIVE
Statutes and rules whose interpretation is
determinative are as follows:
Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-1-1, 7-1-3, 7-1-7, 7-1-8, 7-1-13,
7-1-14, 7-1-17, 7-1-18, 7-1-26, 63-30-4, 63-30-4(2), 70B-1-102,

70B-2-104, 70B-3-104, 70B-2-106, 70B-3-503, 70B-3-504, 70B-3-506,
70B-6-103, 70B-6-104, 70B-6-109, 70B-6-110, 78-12-26, 78-12-28,
78-12-29, Utah R. Civ. P. 23.
The texts of these rules are contained in the addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by eleven investors in Grove Finance
Company to recover the amount of their investment plus interest
from Brimhall and Borthick, the former Commissioners of the Utah
Department of Financial Institutions.

Appellants initially sued

Commissioner Borthick and the State, but their action against the
State and the Commissioner in his representative capacity was
barred under the notice-of-claim requirement of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.
1983).

Madsen I, 658 P.2d 627, 632-3 (Utah

Prior to 1983, the Immunity Act arguably permitted suits

against officials in an individual capacity where gross
negligence was alleged.
(Utah 1988).

See Madsen II, 769 P.2d 245, 247, 250-52

Appellants then filed this action against

Commissioners Brimhall and Borthick in their individual
capacities claiming gross negligence.
The appellants allege that the Commissioners were
grossly negligent in failing to monitor Grove Finance Company's
financial soundness, at the same level of scrutiny applied to a
bank or other depository institution under Chapter 7 of the Utah
Code; and in the alternative, under provisions of Utah's previous
version of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, in failing to
investigate Grove Finance's "financial responsibility" prior to

licensing, to examine its records and business, apparently also
for financial soundness, and to revoke its license.

Had the

Commissioners done this, the appellants claim, they would not
have invested in Grove.

Appellants thus base their action on a

duty by the Commissioners running to investors to have prevented
their investment loss, presumably by investigating the financial
soundness of Grove Finance and then either closing Grove sooner
or notifying them of the institution's condition.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
BRIMHALL AND BORTHICK OWED NO ACTIONABLE
DUTY TO APPELLANTS
Brimhall and Borthick were charged with statutory
responsibilities in serving as Commissioners of Financial
Institutions.

Those obligations were not actionable legal duties

owed to each appellant.

According to the weight of authority,

the obligations were "public duties," the breach of which is not
actionable.
POINT II
BRIMHALL AND BORTHICK ARE PROTECTED BY
GOOD FAITH IMMUNITY
The common law grants immunity to public officials from
suits growing out of the performance of lawfully authorized
discretionary duties.

This protection is available so long as

the official acts in good faith and without any willful or
intentional wrongdoing.

The actionable conduct identified by

appellants involves discretionary activities, namely interpreting
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statutes that define the obligation of a Commissioner of
Financial Institutions to inspect financial institutions.

Since

appellants allege merely gross negligence in performing these
discretionary duties, Brimhall and Brothick are entitled to good
faith immunity.
POINT III
APPELLANTS DID NOT FILE ANY ACTION AGAINST
COMMISSIONER BRIMHALL UNTIL MORE THAN THREE YEARS
AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE IN THIS MATTER. THE
ACTION AGAINST HIM IS THEREFORE BARRED UNDER UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-12-26(4), 78-12-28(1), OR 78-12-29(2)
Appellants' cause of action arose no later than July
18, 1980.

The longest statute of limitation applicable to that

cause of action is three years. The action against Brimhall was
filed July 20, 1983, more than three years after the claim arose,
The claim against Brimhall is barred by the statute of
limitations, and the savings statute at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40
does not help appellants.

The appellants' 1983 action does not

relate back to their 1981 lawsuit involving the same subject
matter, but relates to different claims and defendants.
POINT IV
CERTIFICATION OF THE CLASS SHOULD BE DENIED
BECAUSE RES JUDICATA BARS THE PUTATIVE CLASS
MEMBERS FROM PROCEEDING IN THE ACTION.
The putative class members previously commenced an
action like that of appellants.

Their claims were dismissed by

the trial court, and this Court affirmed that judgment in Hilton
v. Borthick, 791 P.2d 504 (Utah 1989).

The class members are

bound by that determination here because the four elements of the
claim preclusion branch of res judicata have been satisfied.
-6-

POINT V
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IS NOT A BASIS FOR CERTIFYING
A CLASS TO PROCEED AS A CLASS ACTION
The putative class members contend they were certified
as a class in Hilton v. Borthick and therefore must be certified
as such in this action.

This unusual theory cannot be used to

circumvent the requirements of Rule 23, Utah R. Civ. P.

The

class cannot satisfy these requirements, so denial of
certification was proper.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BRIMHALL AND BORTHICK OWED NO ACTIONABLE
DUTY TO APPELLANTS
This Court has established that a precondition to
maintaining a negligence action is the existence of a duty of
care owed by the defendant to the particular plaintiff.

Beach v.

University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 413-15, 418 (Utah 1986); Weber
v. Sprinqville City, 725 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah 1986).

Duty is

entirely a question of law to be determined by the court.

See

Ld.
A.

Public Duty in Utah

In negligence actions against public entities or
officials, it is also well established that the plaintiff must
show the breach of a duty owed to him as an individual and not
merely the breach of an obligation owed to the general public.
In Obray v. Malmberq, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (1971) a
claimed failure by the sheriff to investigate a burglary was
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ruled not actionable.

In Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612

(Utah 1984), this Court refused to adopt a purported "trend"
holding public officials liable where deputies had stopped, but
not arrested, the intoxicated decedent prior to his fatal
motorcycle accident.

Despite a statutory charge to "make all

lawful arrests," Utah Code Ann. § 17-22-2, the duty of police to
the public at large was not a duty to the decedent giving rise to
tort liability.

This Court has also concluded that, when a

governmental entity undertakes to render services, the scope of
any duty purported to have thus been assumed will be narrowly
construed.

See Weber, 725 P.2d at 1364 (undertaking maintenance

and dredging operations on Hobble Creek did not give rise to duty
to protect city residents from hazards associated with the
creek).
This Court has recently reaffirmed and clarified that a
duty must be owed to the plaintiff as an individual in Ferree v.
State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989).

That case involved a wrongful

death action alleging that corrections officers were "reckless,
negligent, or grossly negligent" in their failure to supervise an
inmate who killed the decedent while on an authorized release
from a halfway house.

In affirming a summary judgment in favor

of the State and corrections officials, this Court stated that
"[t]o establish negligence or gross negligence, the plaintiff
must first establish a duty of care owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff. . . . "

Ici. at 151 (emphasis added).

This Court continued:
For a governmental agency and its agents
to be liable for negligently caused injuries

suffered by a member of the public, the
plaintiff must show a breach of a duty owed
him as an individual, not merely the breach
of an obligation owed the general public at
large, . . .
Id.

To adopt the plaintiff's theory of duty, the Ferree Court

reasoned, would impose too broad a duty of care which would
expose corrections officers to potential liability for every
wrong that flows from necessary correctional programs.

Noting

that other jurisdictions have generally held that there is "no
duty toward persons in the general public" in such circumstances,
this Court further found that the public interest would not be
served "by imposing liability on corrections officials . . . for
the uncertain success that attends parol and probation programs."
Id. "In short, the officials had no duty of due care to the
victim apart from their general duty to the public at large."
Id.
The present case is similar to Ferree in that the duty
of a Commissioner of Financial Institutions is to protect the
public financial system generally, not to guarantee any and all
losses suffered by investors in all financial institutions.
Neither statute nor common sense justifies inflicting the
Commissioners with personal liability for the losses of
individual investors because they concluded in good faith that
they lacked statutory authority to regulate a particular class of
institutions for a financial soundness, or because their
regulation was arguably imperfect in some other way.

The public

interest would not be served by permitting this action because it
would unduly burden public officials charged with financial
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regulation, deter able individuals from serving in that
capacity,

and chill legitimate regulatory efforts.
In a very similar recent case, addressing a

governmental immunity issue, this Court cited sound public policy
which is just as pertinent here:
Public entities and public employees
should not be liable for failure . . . to
enforce any law. They should not be liable
for failing to inspect persons or property
adequately to determine compliance with
health and safety regulations. Nor should
they be liable for negligent or wrongful
issuance or revocation of licenses and
permits. . . . To provide the utmost public
protection, governmental entities should not
be dissuaded from engaging in such activities
by the fear that liability may be imposed if
an employee performs his duties inadequately.
Moreover, if liability existed for this type
of activity, the risk exposure to which a
public entity would be subject would include
virtually all activities going on within the
community. . . . Far more persons would
suffer if government did not perform these
functions at all than would be benefited by
permitting recovery in those cases where the
government is shown to have performed
inadequately.
Gillman v. Department of Fin. Inst., 782 P.2d 506, 512-13 (Utah
1989)(Citing 4 California Law Revision Commission, Reports,
Recommendations, and Studies, 817-18 (1963)).
B.

Public Duty in Other Jurisdictions

There apparently is no Utah case dealing squarely with
the duty issue in the financial institutions setting.

Courts in

other jurisdictions, however, have nearly unanimously held that
even where a general statutory duty exists to regulate financial
That Commissioner Borthick has had to spend nearly ten years
defending this and related Grove Finance actions is convincing
evidence on this score.

institutions, there is no duty of care upon which liability may
be based.
In Scott v. Department of Commerce, 763 P.2d 341 (Nev.
1988), disappointed investors contended that the statutory scheme
regulating mortgage companies imposed on the State an affirmative
duty to supervise and investigate such companies so as to prevent
investor losses.

The allegations made by appellants in the

present case are very close to those made in Scott:
In particular, the Scotts contend that
the commissioner of financial institutions
had a duty to inspect mortgage companies and
to insure that mortgage companies operated
only if they were eligible for licensing.
Nevada statute provides that the Commissioner
"shall . . . [c]onduct such examinations and
investigations as are necessary to insure
that mortgage companies meet the requirements
of this chapter for obtaining a license . . .
on a continuing basis." N.R.S.
645b.060(2)(e). . . . The Scotts contend
that under these provisions, once the State
was informed that [the mortgage company] was
falsely and fraudulently representing itself
as solvent, the State had a duty to
investigate and to insure that [the company]
operated only if it was eligible for
licensing.
Id. at 342-3.

These allegations notwithstanding, the court ruled

that "when a governmental duty runs to the public, no private
cause of action is created by a breach of such duty.
omitted]

[citations

This rule applies to the regulation of financial

institutions."

Id. at 344 (emphasis added).

The Scott court relied on Commonwealth, Dept. of
Banking and Securities v. Brown, 605 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1980).

In

Brown, the plaintiffs sought damages for the dereliction of state
examiners in not ascertaining or reporting the true condition of

_i i _

the records of two building and loan associations.

Reversing a

judgment and dismissing the action, the Kentucky Supreme Court
stated:
There is no public policy requiring
government to guarantee the success of its
efforts. When the governmental entity is
performing a self-imposed protective function
as it was in the case at hand, the individual
citizen has no right to demand recourse
against it though he is injured by its
failure to efficiently perform such function.
Any ruling to the contrary would tend to
constitute the commonwealth an insurer of the
quality of services its many agents perform
and serve only to stifle governments attempts
to perform needed services to the public
which could not otherwise be effectively
supplied.
Id. at 4 99.

Conceding that the State may sometimes act

imperfectly, but finding that risk to be "the natural concomitant
of our form of government," the court continued: M[w]e perceive
that the public interest is better served by a government which
can aggressively seek to identify and meet the current need of
the citizenry, uninhibited by the threat of financial loss should
its good faith efforts prove less than optimal—or even
desirable—results. " Id.
Numerous federal cases have held that the FDIC and
other federal regulatory agencies, although statutorily charged
with supervisory duties over financial institutions, nevertheless
have no duty of care upon which defrauded investors or others may
base recovery.

See, e.g., FDIC v. Renda, 692 F. Supp. 129, 135

(D. Kan. 1988)(gives summary of cases holding that "regulatory
activities of a governmental agency do not give rise to a duty to
discover and report possible fraud or wrongdoing to a bank or its
. . . shareholders . . . or depositors").
-1 9-

In complex litigation involving what was then the
largest bank failure in United States history, the court followed
this reasoning in granting the government's motion for summary
judgment.

In re Franklin National Bank Securities Litigation,

478 F. Supp. 210 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).

The court found that no common

law theory and no statutory provision regarding duties of the
Comptroller, Federal Reserve Bank, or FDIC created any actionable
duty.

The court stated that supervision of the banking system is

for the protection of the public as a whole, not for the
protection of the banks and their shareholders.
This analysis has lead every court
addressing the issue to conclude that the
comptroller's mandate to conduct national
bank examinations does not create an
actionable duty running to the examined bank;
the comptroller's failure to detect weakness
or dishonesty at an examined bank gives rise
to no cause of action against the United
States.
Id. at 215. Many other courts have reached the same conclusion.
See Harmsen v. Smith, 586 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1978); FSLIC v.
Burdette, 718 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); FDIC v. Niver, 685
F. Supp. 766 (D. Kan. 1987); FDIC v. Dempster, 637 F. Supp. 362
(E.D. Tenn. 1986); FDIC v. Jennings, 615 F. Supp. 465 (W.D. Okla.
1985), aff'd, 816 F.2d 1488 (10th Cir. 1987); FSLIC v. Williams,
599 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Md. 1984).
The sound legal and policy bases relied on in these
cases apply four-square here. Allowing this action would impose
on public officials a duty impossible to fulfill—to insure that
no investor in a financial institution ever looses the funds
invested.

If such a duty is imposed, it is difficult to imagine

-13-

how anyone in full possession of his or her faculties would ever
again consent to serve the public in this position.
C.

Errors in Appellants' Arguments

It is against the sound legal and policy bases in the
above decisions that appellants contend Brimhall and Borthick
owed actionable legal duties to them individually.

They argue

that the Commissioner had a duty to protect appellants.

They

also contended that the rule of Obray/ Christenson and Ferree
does not apply in this personal capacity action.
1.

No duty to protect individuals

In supposing the Commissioners owed a duty to them,
appellants focus on statutory and case law.

They reason that

this legal authority establishes the Commissioners' legal
obligation to protect them.

Such authority, however, has no

application here.
Titles 7 and 70B were not designed to protect
appellants.

Title 7 plainly declares that its purpose is to

protect the general public rather than particular individuals.
Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-3 (1979 Supp.) states that the Commissioner
shall make a biennial report to the governor on banking business
that is regulated in the State "and other matters that may be of
interest to the public. . . . " (emphasis added).

This Court

affirmed this point in the Tripp case cited by plaintiffs:

"Once

each year it is made [the Commissioners] duty to examine certain
institutions.

The public has such interest in the maintenance of

such institutions."

Tripp v. District Court, 89 Utah 8, 56 P.2d

1355, 1359 (1936)(emphasis added).

1 A

Appellants' contrary

contention is wrong because the statutes on which they rely were
not applicable when the cause of action arose in 1980.

Those

statutes, Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-102 and -301 were enacted in 1981
after appellants' claim arose.

Thus, any possible extension of a

Commissioner's public duty in the 1981 provisions does not apply
to Borthick or Brimhall.
Title 70B is similarly unsuited for the protection of
appellants.

Its purpose is to "protect consumer buyers, lessors,

and borrowers" against the improprieties of some creditors.
Code Ann. § 70B-1-102(2)(d).

Utah

Consumer buyers and borrowers are

persons, not organizations, who insure debt to obtain goods,
services, or interests in land.
70B-3-104.

Utah Code Ann. § 70B-2-104,

Consumer lessors are persons, not organizations who

lease goods.

_Id. at § 70B-2-106.

Under these definitions,

appellants are not "consumer buyers, lessors, [or] borrowers."
Appellants call themselves "depositors" with Grove Finance and
they alleged they "placed large sums of money" with that
institution.

Placing or investing money does not involve a

purchase or lease of consumer goods and is entirely unrelated to
incurring a debt and becoming a debtor.

Appellants are not

within the class to be protected by title 70B.
The three court opinions that appellants cite are
unpersuasive.

The courts in Little, Maricopa County and Franz

extended a public duty to particular individuals because they
found that state statutes were intended to protect certain
classes of which the plaintiffs were members.

It was established

above, however, that appellants were not to be protected by

Titles 7 and 70B.

Therefore, the reasoning of appellants case

authority has no application here.
In Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services,
667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), this Court decided that the Division
owed a duty to protect a particular autistic child who was in its
legal custody.

Id., at 54. This holding was based on a statute

that expressly imposed on legal custodians a duty to protect
custodial children.

Ici. In the present case, by contrast, the

statutes appellants cite are completely different.

Titles 7 and

70B do not govern the kind of intimate, dependent relation that
the Little statute involved.

The Titles define the obligations

of a public official in regulating commercial institutions.
Moreover, neither Title 7 nor Title 70B is designed to protect
appellants as individuals.

Title 7's obligations were to the

public, and Title 70B duties were to consumer debtors, not
investors or creditors/depositors.

The distinction between this

case and Little demonstrates that Little has no application here.
The holdings in Franz and Maricopa County are similarly
inapplicable.

In Tcherepnin v. Franz, 570 F.2d 187, 191 (7th

Cir. 1978), the court extended an official's public duty to
savings and loan depositors because his express statutory
obligations were to protect the savings and loan "association".
Similarly, in State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 599
P.2d 777 (Ariz. 1979), a public official had a duty to particular
persons because they were in a class to be protected by state
statute.

In the present case, Title 7 and 70B do not protect

appellants because Title 7 obligations are owed to the public and
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duties under 70B benefit consumer buyers, borrowers and lessors
rather than depositors.
Appellants finally cite Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d
1187 (Utah 1989).

They rely on it to suggest that the

Commissioners' statutory obligations are duties running to
appellants as well as the public.
appellants misread Owens.

In making such an argument the

The decision expressly states it is

founded on common law rules governing the determination of duty.
Id. at 1189, n.2.

The Owens Court did not decide whether a

public duty ran in favor of particular individuals because it
found there was no duty whatsoever.

Ici. Owens is inapplicable

because it deals with determining duty and not with extending
public duty to private individuals
2.

Public duty and statutory immunity

Appellants further contend that the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act forecloses application of the rule of Obray,
Christensen and Ferree.

Their argument, drawn from foreign

jurisdictions, is that this rule is a form of sovereign immunity
that cannot be used to supplement the grants and waivers of
immunity in the Governmental Immunity Act.

Since the Act permits

personal capacity suits for gross negligence, appellants reason
that no other rule of law can bar their action.
This argument fails for several reasons.

First, this

Court in Obray, Christensen and Ferree held that personal
capacity actions could not proceed in the absence of a duty owed
to a particular plaintiff rather than the public at large.
Second, the decisions cited by appellants employ reasoning
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inconsistent with Utah law.

They uniformly assume that common

law cannot broaden statutory immunity granted by the legislature,
and that assumption is contrary to Utah law.

For example, the

court in Brennon v. Eugene, 591 P.2d 719, 725 (Oregon 1979) based
its holding on a finding that "we find no warrant for engrafting
an additional exception onto the statute [that waives
governmental immunity]."

By contrast, this Court has expressly

held that the concept of public duty is not a form of sovereign
immunity.

Ferree, 784 P.2d at 152-53. Moreover, statute and

common law permit the use of common law immunity as a supplement
to the immunities granted in the Governmental Immunity Act. See,
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(2); Utah State University v. Sutro & Co,
646 P.2d 715, 721 (Utah 1982).
D.

Conclusion

The statutory obligations of Brimhall and Borthick to
regulate Grove Finance were for the benefit of the public.
were not intended to protect appellants.
is consistent with this conclusion.

They

The weight of authority

Appellants contrary

contention is based on case law that reflects a minority view and
on statutes that do not protect appellants.

The duties of the

Commissioners were public duties, the breach of which is not
actionable.
POINT II
THE COMMISSIONERS ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT
UNDER THE GOOD-FAITH QUALIFIED IMMUNITY EXTENDED
TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS PERFORMING LAWFULLY AUTHORIZED
DISCRETIONARY DUTIES
In Utah State University v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715
(Utah 1982) this Court affirmed a dismissal of third-party
_1 Q_

complaints against members of the USU institutional counsel.

The

University had sued brokers to recover losses sustained in an
investment program after it was determined that the investments
were not authorized by statute. Although the counsel members had
allowed the improper use of public funds, this Court stated:
The generally recognized doctrine of law
is that public officials are protected by a
qualified immunity from suits growing out of
the performance of lawfully authorized
discretionary duties, so long as they are
acting in good faith and are not guilty of
any willful or intentional wrongdoing. The
underlying reasons for this are that such
protection is in accord with the interest of
justice; is necessary as a mater of public
policy in order not to deter persons of
capability and integrity from accepting the
responsibilities of public office; and that
when they are so serving they should be free
to exercise their judgment without fear of
damage suits because someone thinks they made
a mistake in judgment. . . . [W]hen a public
official is so acting in good-faith in
performing his discretionary duties he is not
liable in damages simply because he may make
a mistake in judgment.
Id. at 721 (footnotes omitted).

Like the plaintiffs in Sutro,

the appellants here do not allege that Commissioners Brimhall and
Borthick acted "in bad faith nor that [they] committed any
willful or intentional wrong."

Id.

Recognition of official good-faith immunity is in
accord with Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(2) and was enacted within
the year following the Sutro decision.

That section states

M

[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely

effecting any immunity from suit which a governmental entity or
employee may otherwise assert under State or Federal law."
Code Ann. § 63-30-4(2).

-1 Q_

Utah

Appellants contend that such immunity is not available
because the Commissioners' acts were ministerial rather than
discretionary.

Since Titles 7 and 70B impose mandatory tasks,

appellants reason that the duties involved no exercise of
discretion.
Appellants mischaracterize the nature of the
Commissioners' duties.

First, they fail to recognize that the

Commissioners would be required initially to decide whether Grove
Finance was subject to Title 7 or Title 70B.

Only after making

such a decision could they proceed with the mandatory tasks
appellants mention.

It is this determination that is

discretionary. See Gormely v. State, 189 S.E. 288 (Ga. Ct. App.
1936).

Second, appellants incorrectly assume that the mandatory

tasks of Title 70B are truly ministerial.

The parties dispute

the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 70B-3-505(l) and -506(1) which
appellants claim obligated the Commissioners to inspect Grove
Finance for financial soundness.

This dispute in statutory

construction demonstrates that Brimhall and Borthick would
exercise discretion in determining that their mandatory duties
were under those sections.

Even appellants have conceded the

discretionary nature of this decision by pleading in their
complaint alternative causes of action under Title 7 and Title
70B.

POINT III
APPELLANTS DID NOT FILE ANY ACTION AGAINST
COMMISSIONER BRIMHALL UNTIL MORE THAN THREE YEARS
AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE IN THIS MATTER. THE
ACTION AGAINST HIM IS THEREFORE BARRED UNDER UTAH CODE
ANN- § 78-12-26(4), 78-12-28(1), OR 78-12-29(2).
It is undisputed that (1) this cause of action arose,
at the latest, on July 18, 1980, when Grove Finance closed its
doors and possession was taken by the Commissioner of Financial
Institutions; (2) Commissioner Brimhall was not named a party
defendant in Madsen I, either by name or descriptive designation;
and (3) Commissioner Brimhall was first named a defendant when
Madsen II was filed on July 20, 1983, more than three years after
the cause of action arose.

In the original complaint in Madsen

1^ Commissioner Brimhall is not named and no allegation is made
of any act or omission which occurred during his administration
giving rise to liability.

Unlike Madsen I, where only

Commissioner Borthick was named in an official capacity, both
Commissioners are named in this action in their individual
capacity.

Madsen II, 769 P.2d 245, 246-7 (Utah 1988).

Thus, in

order for the action to be deemed timely against Commissioner
Brimhall, a statue of limitation longer than three years must be
determined to apply.
There are three statutes of limitation which might
possibly apply—Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-26(4), 78-12-28(1) or 7812-29(2).

While this Court has not squarely ruled which of these

statutes applies in this case, Madsen I, 658 P.2d 627, 631 n.7
(Utah 1983), Madsen II, 769 P.2d 245, 254 (Utah 1988), appellants
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have not alleged until this appeal that any different provision
could apply-2

See, e.g., Madsen II, 769 P.2d at 253-4.

Of the three possible statutes of limitation, Utah Code
Ann. S 78-12-26(4), the three year statute which bars an action
M

for a liability created by the statutes of this state," seems

mostly likely to apply.

Madsen I makes clear that any action

which Appellants now have against Commissioners Brimhall and
Borthick must be brought against them in their personal
capacities, under a standard of gross negligence pursuant to the
requirements of section 63-30-4.

658 P.2d at 633;

See Madsen

II, 769 P.2d at 247, 252-3, n.12. Appellants' causes of action,
if any, are thus created and governed by section 63-30-4.

This

is an action "created by the statutes of this state" as provided
by section 78-12-26(4) and, consequently, the action was barred
after three years.
It is also worthy of note that in Madsen I the
appellants attempted to persuade the Court that the action was
brought at common-law, and not under the Governmental Immunity
Act, since the latter would subject appellants "to a shorter
statute of limitations than would apply if their cause of action
were rooted in a common-law claim (e.g., compare § 78-12-26(4)
with § 78-12-25(2) [then, the catch-all provision for tort
actions]."

Madsen I, 658 P.2d at 631, n.7 (emphasis added).

But

this Court rejected that argument, squarely holding the
2
In their brief to this Court, appellants for the
first time allege that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(2) applies.
Brief of Appellants, p. 17. Since appellants did not raise that
issue at the trial court in their opposition to Defendant
Brimhall's Motion for Summary Judgment, they may not now do so.
_oo

Governmental Immunity Act to apply in this action, and by its
language, clearly implying that the action against both the State
and Commissioner Borthick would be governed by the statute of
limitation in section 78-12-26(4).

Id.

In addition, appellants earlier in this action candidly
conceded that:
[They] filed the complaint with the court in
the instant action on July 20, 1983. The
cause of action arose when Grove Finance was
forced to close its doors on July 18, 1980.
Under normal circumstances, that action would
have been barred by the statute of
limitations which at most ran for three years
and thus, possibly expired on July 18, 1983.
However, section 78-12-40, Utah Code Ann.,
applies in this matter. . . .
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment (dated October 7, 1983), p. 4 (emphasis added).

Since

appellants concede that the first time an action was filed by
them naming or even describing Commissioner Brimhall was more
than three years after their cause of action arose, the action
was barred by the statute of limitation.
A sound case can also be made for application of Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-28(1), the two-year limit on actions against an
"officer upon a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his
official capacity, and by virtue of his office, or by the
omission of an official duty. . . . "

(emphasis added).

Commissioner Brimhall is named in his personal capacity, albeit
for acts taken or omitted as Financial Commissioner, and the
gravamen of the action is that he somehow omitted an official
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duty in failing to regulate Grove Finance so as to prevent loss
3
of the Appellants' investments.
Appellants argue, however, that section 78-12-40
applies because there is an identity of interest between
Commissioner Brimhall and Commissioner Borthick.

It is claimed

that the filing of the Complaint in this action, which names the
Commissioners in their personal capacity, relates back to the
filing of Madsen I in 1981 because of the identity of interest
between Commissioners Brimhall and Borthick.

This theory fails

for two reasons.
First, the record establishes no identity of interest
between the two Commissioners of Financial Institutions.
Appellants contend there is an identity of interest because
Borthick continued the same policy followed by the Department of
Financial Institutions under Brimhall as to the extent of
regulation over supervised lenders permitted by law.
establishes an identity of interest is not explained.

How this
It must be

remembered that Commissioners Brimhall and Borthick are being
sued in their personal capacities, not in their official
capacities.
This Court has defined "identity of interest" in this
context as "so closely related in their business operations that
notice of the action against one serves to provide notice of the
action to the other."

Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.# 681

To the extent that the action can be characterized as
an action for a penalty against the State or its officials,
section 78-12-29(2) could also apply, since the action is clearly
"given to an individual."
_Ov1_

P.2d 214, 217 (Utah 1984).

It simply cannot be pretended that

Brimhall and Borthick as individuals, although both former public
officials, have such a close relation that notice to one would
serve as notice to both.

Were appellants' argument to stand,

presumably any former public official could be sued in his
individual capacity after the running of a statute of limitation
as long as a successor was sued within the statutory time.
In Perry, this Court affirmed summary judgment against
a subcontractor who filed an untimely third-party complaint
against a supplier and manufacturer, holding that privity of
contract was an insufficient identity of interest.

Moreover, in

Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 761 P.2d 581, 586-7 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), the court held that a former policy holder's motion to
amend a complaint to allege a cause of action against an
insurance salesman was properly denied.

Even though the salesman

was already named in a third-party action by the defendant
insurance company on an indemnification theory, the policy
holder's negligence action was time-barred and could not be saved
on the basis of any "identity of interest."
Second, the "identity of interest" exception applies
only where an amendment is sought in a pending cause of action
under Rule 15(c) U.R.C.P.—not as here where an attempt is made
to have the filing of a second action relate back to the filing
of a different action previously dismissed.
does not apply in this setting.

The theory simply

As stated in Doxey-Layton Co. v.

Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976):
Generally Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P., will not
apply to an amendment which substitutes or

adds new parties for those brought before the
court by the original pleadings—whether
plaintiff or defendant. This for the reason
that such would amount to a new cause of
action/ and if such were allowed to relate
back to the filing of the complaint/ the
purpose of a statute of limitations would be
defeated.
Id. at 906 (emphasis added).
As in the present case, the doctrine does not avail
where an effort is made to have a wholly separate cause of action
relate back to an earlier complaint.

The reason this action has

survived is that this Court in Madsen II was persuaded that it is
a different action from Madsen I, not subject to dismissal on res
judicata grounds even though the earlier action was dismissed.
Appellants cannot now be legitimately heard to argue that the two
actions are somehow the same, allowing the naming of Commissioner
Brimhall for the first time in 1983 to relate back to the filing
of Madsen I in 1981.
In addition, Madsen II dictates no contrary result.
The reversal of summary judgment on the limitation issue under
section 78-12-40 was based upon the principle that "a plaintiff
whose action fails on grounds other than its merits may have one
year from the date of the failure to file a new action so long as
the first action was 'commenced within due time.'"

769 P.2d at

254 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40)(emphasis added).

In its

ruling on the petition for rehearing in Madsen 11/ this Court
apparently accepted the argument that the issue of Commissioner
Brimhall not having been named in Madsen I was not raised on the
motion or on appeal, and was therefore not properly before the
Court.

The issue not having been raised or considered before, is

properly before the Court at this time.

Even if this Court finds that the Appellants' action
against Commissioner Brimhall is not barred by the statute of
limitations; the trial court's grant of summary judgment was
harmless error.

The "public duty" rule and good-faith immunity,

as argued in Points I and II of this brief, also apply to
Commissioner Brimhall.

Both of those doctrines would preclude

any claim against Commissioner Brimhall for his good-faith
actions which relate to his duties as Commissioner of Financial
Institutions.

POINT IV
CERTIFICATION OF THE CLASS WAS PROPERLY DENIED
BECAUSE RES JUDICATA BARS THE PUTATIVE CLASS
MEMBERS FROM PROCEEDING IN THE ACTION
The putative class, consisting of all investors in
Grove Finance save the Madsen appellants, sued the state and
Commissioner Borthick for all of their losses occasioned by the
failure of Grove Finance.

They alleged improper supervision and

regulation by the Commissioner and Department of Financial
Institutions.

After extensive discovery, briefing and argument,

summary judgment was granted against them on the basis of the
Governmental Immunity Act.

That order was affirmed in Hilton v.

Borthick, 791 P.2d 504, 504 (Utah 1989).

That judgment is

binding on the class and cannot be circumvented by certification
in a second similar action.
In a recent decision in this case, this Court set out
the requirements for application of the claim preclusion branch
of res judicata:

First, both cases must involve the same
parties or their privies. Second, the claim
that is alleged to be barred must have been
presented in the first suit or must be one
that could and should have been raised in the
first action. Third, the first suit must
have resulted in a final judgment on the
merits. [citations omitted].
Madsen II, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988).

Each of these

requirements is satisfied here.
First, the appellants did not dispute that Commissioner
Brimhall in his official capacity is in privity to the state.
Id.

Furthermore, Commissioner Borthick is named in both the

instant action and Hilton.
Second, allegations of gross negligence or other
impropriety against the Commissioners certainly could have been
raised by the class in Hilton.

Both actions arise out of

precisely the same circumstances and both seek exactly the same
relief against the state or its commissioners.

" [Relitigation

of issues which were actually litigated or could have been
litigated in a prior proceeding is barred by res judicata."
Cox v. Cedar City Corp., 664 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1983).

In Cox,

after losing a nuisance action filed by the city, the property
owner brought an action for damages for conversion of his
personal property during abatement.

This was a matter, this

Court said, which could have been litigated in a prior
proceeding.

Similarly here, by slightly shifting ground on one

legal theory in alleging "gross negligence" instead of mere
negligence does not deprive the first judgment of preclusive
affect as to the class.

As to the third criterion in the present case, this
Court found that appellants' failure to file a statutory notice
of claim amounted to failure to meet a precondition to suit,
which amounted to a "lack of jurisdiction" under Rule 41 (b). No
such situation is present with Hilton.

The trial judge's ruling,

following extensive discovery and briefing in which the factual
background of the case was thoroughly explored by both parties
and presented to the trial court, centered not on any procedural
default by the plaintiffs, but on the application of substantive
immunities preserved by the Immunity Act.

It cannot be sensibly

argued that this does not constitute a judgment on the merits.
If it did not constitute a judgment on the merits, each of the
1,250 investors could immediately file his or her own separate
action, and this would be so in every case where a dismissal is
granted based on substantive immunity.

Moreover, it is clear

that res judicata principles apply fully in class actions:
There is of course no dispute that under
elementary principles of prior adjudication a
judgment in a properly entertained class
action is binding on class members in any
subsequent litigation.
Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984).

4

4
In Madsen II this Court recognized that construction of similar
or identical Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be helpful.
769 P.2d at 248-9 and n.4.
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POINT V
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IS NOT A BASIS FOR CERTIFYING
A CLASS TO PROCEED AS A CLASS ACTION
Even if class certification is not barred by res
judicata, collateral estoppel is not a basis for certifying a
class to proceed as a class action.

Under the Utah Rule

governing class actions:
One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of
all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the
class.
U.R.C.P. 23(a)(emphasis added).
In seeking class certification, the appellants' bear
the burden of establishing that the cause of action merits
5
treatment of a class action and that all the requirements of the
certification rule have been satisfied.

59 Am. Jur. 2nd § 78;

Kniffin v. Colorado Western Dev. Co., 622 P.2d 586 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1980).

In McCabe v. Burqeis, 75 111. 2nd 457, 389 N.E.2nd

565 (1979), the court applied a similar class action rule and
held that the "proponent of the class action has the burden of
establishing these prerequisites and the court must find them
present before it can sanction the maintenance of the action as a
class action."

Id. at 567.

59 Am. Jur. 2nd § 78; Cincinatti v. Alexander, 54 Ohio St. 2nd
248, 375 N.E. 2nd 1241 (1978).
„on

The appellants in this case have failed to carry their
burden by simply alleging collateral estoppel.

Class actions are

used as a means of economy "motivated by the practical necessity
of providing a procedural device so that mere numbers would not
disable large groups of individuals, united in interest, from
enforcing their equitable wrongs."

Wright, Miller, and Kane,

Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2nd 1751 (citing Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948)).

Class

standing should not be granted simply because a similar case was
granted class standing.

Appellants have not shown or alleged

that any of the requirements for class standing have been met,
nor have they given any support for the proposition that class
status may be granted on the basis of collateral estoppel.
Plaintiffs also assert that because the procedural
basis for class certification is identical in both cases, class
status should be granted.

The procedural basis is always

identical in every class action, i.e., Rule 23 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

What is not identical are the facts and

circumstances, which in the instant case, do not independently
warrant class standing.
As previously stated, the first requirement for
maintaining a class action under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 23, is that the class be so numerous "that
joinder of all members is impracticable" U.R.C.P. 23(a).
Appellants' cause of action fails this first requirement.
The only persons who can be members of a possible class
are those with valid claims against the defendants.

See,

U.R.C.P. 23. The cause of action arose no later than July 18,
1980.

It is now over nine years since that date, far longer than

any applicable statue of limitations term.

See, Utah Code Ann. §

78-12-1 to -47. No other investor could, at this late date,
bring an action for gross negligence against Commissioners
Borthick and Brimhall.

Consequently, it is practical to join all

members in this action.
The jurisdictions which have considered whether a
motion seeking class status relates back to the original filing
date to preserve individual claims have returned a resounding no.
The court in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines Inc., 567 F.2d 429
(D.C. Cir. 1976), held that:
Filing cannot revive claims which are no
longer viable at the time of filing. . . .
Time barred members could not press their
claims individually . . . and surely the
employer's liability cannot be made to depend
upon whether they come into court in a
different character. . . . [0]nly those
employees who could have filed charges with
the commission individually when the class
filing was made are properly members of the
litigating class.
Id. at 472. The court in Healy v. Loeb Rhodes & Co., 99 F.R.D.
540 (N.D. 111. 1983), also held that "time barred claims are not
revived by their assertion in a class action."

_Id. at 543.

Any motion now seeking class certification will not
resurrect time barred claims of other investors.

Only those

persons who still have valid claims against the defendants may be
part of the class. As this consists only of the appellants
already named in the complaint, any motion for class standing or
certification to include other plaintiffs, is improper.

CONCLUSION
The trial court properly decided that the duties of a
Commissioner of Financial Institutions are discretionary and only
for the benefit of the public.

The court below also properly

denied class certification and granted summary judgment to
Commissioner Brimhall on the basis of the statute of limitations.
The judgments of the trial court should be affirmed.
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ADDENDUM

7-1-1. Department of financial institutions—Commissioner of financial
institutions—Appointment, term, qualifications, salary,* oath and bond.—
(!) There shall be a state department of financial institutions which
*hall have charge of the execution of the laws of this state relating to
banks and other financial institutions subject to this title and relating to
the business conducted by each.
(2) The chief officer of the state department of financial institutions
shall be the commissioner of financial institutions who shall be appointed
by the governor by and with the consent of the senate. He shall hold
office for the term of four years and until his successor is appointed and
qualified, but he shall be subject to removal at the pleasure of the governor.
(3) The commissioner of financial institutions shall be a resident of
this state and a citizen of the United States and shall have had sufficient
experience in banking in an executive or administrative capacity or as
an employee of a state or federal bank supervisory agency to demonstrate
his qualifications and fitness to perform the duties of his office.
(4) The salary of the commissioner of financial institutions shall be
fixed by the governor in accordance with standards adopted by the department of finance, and in addition thereto he may be allowed actual traveling expenses necessarily incurred in attending to official business. lie shall
qualify by taking the constitutional oath of office and by giving to the state
a bond in such amount and in such form as shall be prescribed by the department of finance, conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties.
The premiums on such bond shall be paid by the state.

7-1-3. Biennial reports by commissioner.—The bank commissioner shall
make on or before the 1st day of October, biennially, a report to the governor, containing a copy of the last report furnished by each institution
under the supervision of the banking department and any other proceedings had or done by the department showing generally the condition of
the businesses under the supervision of the banking department and such
other matters in connection with such businesses as may be of intorcsl 1o
the public; and a detailed statement, verified by oath, of all fees and other
moneys received by the department during the same period.

7-1-7. Institutions under banking department.—All banks, all loan and
trust corporations, all building? and loan associations, all industrial loan
companies, all credit unions, all small loan businesses required to obtain
a license under any provision of law, and all bank service corporations
shall be under the supervision of the banking department, and shall be
subject to examination by the bank commissioner and the examiners.

7-1-8. Visitation and examination.—The bank commissioner, or an
ixamincr, shall visit and examine every bank, savings bank, every loan
ind trust corporation, every building and loan association, every industrial
oan company, every small loan business, and every co-operative bank, at
least once in each year. At every such examination careful inquiry shall
be made as to the condition and resources of the institution examined,
the mode of conducting and managing its affairs, the official actions of
its directors and oflficers, the investment and disposition of its funds, the
security afforded to members, if any, and to those by whom its engagements are held, whether or not it is violating any of the provisions of law
relating to corporations or to the business of the institution examined,
whether or not it is complying with its articles of incorporation and
bylaws, and as to such other matters as the commissioner may prescribe.

7-1-13. Removal of incompetent bank officers and employees.—If tlie
bank commissioner finds that any officer or employee of any institution
under the supervision of the bankinp department is dishonest, reckless or
incompetent, or fails to perform any duty of his office, he shall notify the
board of directors of such institution in writing of his objections to 6uch
officer or employee, and said board shall within twenty days after receipt
of such notification meet and consider such objections, first piving notice
to the bank commissioner of the time and place of meeting. If tlie board
finds the objections well-founded, such officer or employee shall be immediately removed.

7-1-14. Directors to examine affairs of institution.—The bank commissioner may at any time, and at least once a year shall, require the board
of directors of every institution under the supervision of the banking
department to examine or cause to be examined fully the books, papers
and affairs of the institution of which they are directors, and particularly
the loans, discounts and overdrafts thereof, with a special purpose of
ascertaining the value and security thereof and of the'collateral security, if
any, given in connection therewith, and to inquire into such other matters
as the bank commissioner or bank examiner may require, and to cause a
report thereof to be placed on file with the records of such institution,
which report shall be subject to examination by the bank commissioner or
examiner.

7-1-17. Reports — Number per year — Publication — Fees.—The bank
commissioner shall each year make not less than four calls for report of
condition upon each bank and trust company under the supervision of
the banking department. Such report shall be made according to the form
prescribed by the bank commissioner, and shall be verified by the oath or
affirmation of the president or cashier and attested by at least three
directors. A copy thereof duly certified by the bank commissioner shall
be published by the institution making the same in some newspaper having general circulation in the county where the institution is situated,
and proof of such publication shall be filed in the office of the bank
commissioner within thirty days from the time of the receipt by the
institution of the copy certified by the bank commissioner. The fee for
filing and certifying each 6uch report shall be $5.

7-1-18. Calls for special reports.—The bank commissioner shall have
power to call for special reports from any institution under the supervision of the banking department whenever in his judgment the same
may be necessary.

Procedure on application—jucuciai review v* «~*, ~
missioner—Revocation for failure to activate business—Resale of charter,
license or permit prohibited.—(1) The bank commissioner shall have discretionary power in the approval of articles of incorporation of institutions subject to the supervision of the banking department and applications
for licenses to transact in this state any business subject to such supervision,
aud mav refuse to grant his approval when the plan of operation docs not
complv'with the laws of this state governing sucli institution or business,
or with accepted and prevailing practices, or when the incorporators or
organizers or anv of them shall not be of such character, responsibility and
general fitness as to warrant the belief that the business will be honestly
conducted in accordance with law and for the best interests of the members,
customers and depositors of the institution, or when the location or field of
operation of the proposed business shall be in such close proximity to an
established business subject to this title that such established business
might be unreasonablv interfered with and the support of the new business
would be such as to make improbable its success, or when other good and
sufficient reasons exist for such refusal.
(2) Au application for approval of articles of incorporation of a bank,
loan and trust company or industrial loan corporation shall be set forth
in such form and contain such information as the bank commissioner may
reasonably require. Upon receipt of an application and not less than thirty
days before acting on an application, the bank commissioner 6hall give
notice thereof by publication in three successive issues in a newspaper of
general circulation in the county in which the principal pUce of business
is to be established. Any interested person may file a written protest to the
granting of such application stating the grounds therefor. The bank commissioner may, at his discretion, hold a public hearing on any application
whether or not a protest is filed. Any application not acted upon within
six months from the date of filing shall be deemed denied, and the bank
commissioner shall thereupon issue a written decision denying the application.
(3) The decision of the bank commissioner granting or denying an
application shall be in writing and state tlie reasons therefor. A copy of
the decision shall be mailed by the bank commissioner to the applicant and
all protestants. The bank commissioner may impose such reasonable conditions on the granting of an application as he deems necessary for the
public welfare and to carry out the purposes of this act.
(4) Any applicant for an approval of articles of incorporation, a permit
to establish a branch, or a license to transact any business subject to the
supervision of the banking department or any protestant to such application, feeling aggrieved by the act, decision or ruling of the bank commissioner with respect thereto, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof
by filing, within thirty days after the decision or ruling of the bank commissioner is issued, any applicable form of action (including actions for
declaratory judgment or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction),
in the district court of the district in which the office of the bank commissioner is located. The reviewing court shall have power to hold unlawful and set aside any act, decision or ruling of the bank commissioner
found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not
in accordance with law.
(5) Any approval by the bank commissioner of articles of incorporation, a license to conduct business or an application to establish a
branch shall be deemed revoked unless the business so authorized is open
and operating within one year of the date of such approval, except that
the bank commissioner, on written application made before the expiration
of such period and for pood cause shown, may extend the date for activation for additional periods not to exceed six months each.
(6) It shall be unlawful to obtain, for the purpose of resale, a charter,
license or permit to operate any bank or other financial institution under the
supervision of the banking department. The charter, license or permit may
be deemed revoked and the bank commissioner may take possession of the
business and property of any bank of other financial institution under his

of a license or permit to do business by the bank commissioner, the assets
or the license to do business or more than 49 per cent of the authorized
capital stock of such bank or other financial institution is sold or exchanged,
or if, within such period, such bank or other financial institution merges or
consolidates with another bank or other financial institution, unless the
bank or other financial institution involved shall establish upon written
application to the bank commissioner and by the clear preponderance of
the evidence, that its charter, license or permit was not obtained for the
purpose of resale or that such sale, exchange, merger or consolidation is
necessary to protect depositors or prevent failure.

7-1 -27, Foreign corporations—Commissioner may revoke certificate.—
Tlie bank commissioner may for cause at any time revoke tlie certificate
of approval and authorization of any foreign corporation authorized to
transact any business in this state and subject to tlie supervision of the
banking department.

63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability
—Effect of waiver of immunity—Exclusive remedy—Joinder of employee—
Limitations on personal liability.—Nothing contained in this act, unless
specifically provided, is to be construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility in so far as governmental entities are concerned.
Wherein immunity from suit is waived by this act, consent to be sued is
granted and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were
a private person.
The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of
authority is, after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil
action or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the
employee or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to
the claim, unless the employee acted or failed to act through gross negligence, fraud, or malice.
An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity
in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee shall be held
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color
of authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act
due to gross negligence, fraud or malice.

70B 1-102 Purposes—Bules of conitruction.—(1) This act shall be
liberally con-trued and applied to promote its underlying purposes and
policies
f2N The underlying purposes and policies of this act are:
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernire the law governing retail installment sales, consumer credit, small loans and usury;
(b) to provide rate ceilings to assure an adequate supply of eredit
to consumers;
(c) to further consumer understanding of the terms of credit transactions and to foster competition among suppliers of consumer
credit so that consumers may obtain credit at reasonable cost;
(d) to protect consumer buyers, lessees, and borrowers against unfair
practices by some suppliers of consumer credit, having due regard
for the interests of legitimate and scrupulous creditors;
(e) to permit and encourage the development of fair and economically
sound credit practices;
(f) to conform the regulation of consumer credit transactions to
the policies of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act [Aet
of May 29. 1968, PL 90-321, 82 Stat 146, 15 U.SC. §§1601 to
1677; 18 USC §§891 to 896]; and
(g) to make uniform the law, including administrative rules, among
the various jurisdictions.
(3) A reference to a requirement imposed by this act includes reference
•« » related rule of the administrator adopted pursuant to this act

63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity —
Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Limitations on personal liability.
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, shall be
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility insofar as
governmental entities or their emplovees are concerned If immunity from
suit is waived b> this chapter, consent to be sued is gTanted and liability of the
entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely affecting any
immunity from suit which a governmental entity or employee may otherwise
assert under state or federal law
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such

70BJ-104 Definition—"Consumer loan".—(1) Except with reipect to
a loan primarily secured by au interest in land (section 70B-3-105), "consumer loan*' is a loan made by a person regularly engaged in the business
of making loans in which
(a) the debtor is a person other than an organization;
(b) the debt is incurred primarily for a personal, family, household,
or agricultural purpose;
(c) either the debt is payable in installments or a loan finance charge
is made; and
(d)

either the principal does not exceed $25,000 or the debt is secured
by an interest in land.
(2) The amount of $25,000 in subsection (1) is subject to change pursuant to the provisions on adjustment of dollar amounts (section 70B-1-106).

70B 2-104. Definition—"Consumer credit sale."—(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), "consumer credit sale" is a sale of goods, services,
or an interest in land in which:
(a) credit is granted or arranged by a seller who regularly engages
as a seller in credit transactions of the same kind,
(b) the buyer is a person other than an organization,
(c) the goods, services, or interest in land are purchased primarily
for a personal, family, household, or agricultural purpose,
(d) either the debt is payable in installments or a credit service
charge is made, and
(e) with respect to a sale of goods or services, the amount financed
does not exceed $25,000.
(2) Unless the sale is made subject to this act by agreement (section
70B-2-601), "consumer credit sale" does not include :
(a) a sale in which the seller allows the buyer to purchase goods or
services pursuant to a lender credit card or similar arrangement, or
(b) except aa provided with respect to maximum charpes (section
70B-2-201), disclosure (section 70B-2-301) and debtors' remedies
(section 70B-5-201), a sale of an interest in land which is used or
expected to be used as the residence of the buyer.
(3) The amount of $25,000 in subsection (1) is subject to change
pursuant to the provisions on adjustment of dollar amounta (section
70B-M06).

70B-2-106. Definition—"Consumer lease."—(1) "Consumer lease" means
a lease of goods
(a) which a lessor regularly engaged in the business 01 leasing makes
to a person, other than an organization, who takes under the
lease primarily for a personal, family, household, or agricultural purpose,
(b) in which the amount payable under the lease does not exceed
$25,000, and
(c) which is for a term exceeding four months.
(2) "Consumer lease" does not include a lease made pursuant to a
lender credit card or similar arrangement.
(3) The amount of $25,000 in subsection (1) is subject to change
pursuant to the provisions on adjustment of dollar amounts (section
70B-M06).

70B6104. Powers of administrator—Harmony with federal rtful*tions—Reliance on ralei—Duty to report.—(1) In addition to other powen
irr.uitd by this act, the administrator within the limitations provided
by law may:
fa) receive and act on complaints, takf action designed to obtain
voluntary compliance with this act, or commence proceedings
on his own initiative;
(b) counsel persons and groups on their rights and duties under
this act;
(c) establish programs for the education of consumers with respect
to credit practices and problems;
(il» make studies appropriate to effectuate the purposes and policies
of this act and make the results available to the public;
(e) adopt, amend, and repeal substantive rules when specifically authorized by this act, and adopt, amend, and repeal procedural
rules to carry out the provisions of this act;
(f i maintain offices within this state; and
(p) employ any necessary hearing examiners, clerks, and other employees and agents.
'2) The administrator shall, adopt rules not inconsistent with the
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act to assure a meaningful disclosure
of credit terms so that a prospective debtor will be able to compare

more readily the various credit terms available to him and to avoid the
uninformed use of credit. These rules may supersede any provisions of this
act which are inconsistent with the Federal Credit Protection Art if the
administrator finds 6uch an inconsistency to exist and declares, that the
purpose of superseding this act is to resolve this inconsistency and may
require disclosure by person* who arrange for the extension of credit, may
contain classifications, differentiations, or other provisions, and may provide
for adjustments and exceptions for any class of transactions subject to
this act which in the judgment of the administrator are necessary or proper
to effectuate the purposes* or to prt?\«nt cm um\ehti<»n or evasion of. or t<»
facilitate compliance with, the provisions of this act relating to disclosure
of credit terms.
(3) To keep the administrator's rules in harmony with the Federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act and the regulations prescribed fr«>m
time to time pursuant to that act by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System and with the rules of administrators in other
jurisdictions which enact t*he Uniform Consumer Credit Code, the administrator, so far as is consistent with the purposes, policies and provisions
of this act, shall:
(a)

before adopting, amending, and repealing rules, advise and consult
with administrators in other jurisdictions which enact the Uniform Consumer Credit Code; and

(b)

in adopting, amending, and repealing rules, take into consideration :
(i) the regulations 60 prescribed by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System; and
(ii) the rules of administrators in other jurisdictions which enact
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.

(4) Except for refund of an excess charge, no liability is imposed
under this act for an act done or omitted in conformity with a rule of the
administrator notwithstanding, that after the act or omission the rule
may be amended or repealed or be determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.

70B-3-506. Examinations and investigations—(1) The administrator
shall examine periodically at intervals be deems appropriate tbe loans,
business, and records of every licensee. In addition, for tbe purpose
of discovering violations of this act or securing information lawfully required, the administrator or the official or agency to whose supervision
the organization is subject (section 70B-6-105) may at any time investigate
the loans, business, and records of any regulated lender. For these purposes
he shall have free and reasonable access to tbe offices, places of business,
and records of the lender.
(2) If the lender's records are located outside this state, the lender
at his option shall make them available to the administrator at a convenient
location within this state, or pay the reasonable and necessary expenses
for the administrator or his representative to examine them at the place
vrhrre they are maintained. The administrator may designate representatives, im-ludmg comparable officials of the state in which the records are
located, to inspect them on his behalf.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the administrator may administer oaths or affirmations, and upon his own motion or upon request
of any party may subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, adduce
evidence, and require the production of any matter which is relevant to the
investigation, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things
and the identity and location of persons having knowledge or relevant
facts, or any other matter reasonably calculated to lead to tbe discovery
of admissible evidence.
(4) Upon failure without lawful excuse to obey a subpoena or to give
testimony and upon reasonable notice to all persons affected thereby, the
administrator may apply to the district court where his offices are located
for an order compelling compliance.

70B-S-603 License to make supervised loans.—(1) The administrator
shall receive and act on all applications for licenses to make supervised
loans under this act. Applications shall be filed in the manner prescribed
by the administrator and shall contain the information the administrator
requires by rule to mako nn evaluation of the financial responsibility, character and fitness of the applicant
70B-S-504. Revocation or suspension of license.—(1) The administrator may issue to a person licensed to make supervised loans an order to
ahow cause why his license should not be revoked or suspended for a period
not in excess of six months. The order shall state the place for a hearing
and set a time for the hearing that is no less than ten days from the date
of the order. After the hearing the administrator shall revoke or suspend
the license if be finds that:
(a) the licensee has repeatedly and willfully violated thia act or any
rule or order lawfully made pursuant to this act; or
(b) facts or conditions exist which would clearly have justified the
administrator in refusing to grant a license had these facts or
conditions been known to exist at tht time the application for
the license was made.
(2) No revocation or suspension of a license is lawful unless prior to
institution of proceedings by the administrator notice is given to the
licensee of the facts or conduct which warrant the intended action, and
the licensee is given an opportunity to ahow compliance with all lawful
requirements for retention of the license.
(3) If the administrator finds that probable cause for revocation of a
license exists and that enforcement of this act requires immediate suspension of the license pending investigation, he may, after a hearing upon five
days' written notice, enter an order suspending the license for not more
than thirty days.
(4) Whenever the administrator revokes or suspends a license, he
ahall enter an order to that effect and forthwith notify the licensee of the
revocation or suspension. "Within five days after the entry of the order
he shall deliver to the licensee a copy of the order and the findings supporting the order.
(5) Any person holding a license to make supervised loans may relinquish the license by notifying the administrator in writing of its relinquishment, but this relinquishment ahall not affect his liability for acta
previously committed.
(6) No revocation, suspension, or relinquishment of a license ahall
impair or affect the obligation of any pre-existing lawful contract between
the licensee and any debtor.
(7) The administrator may reinstate a license, terminate a suspension,
or grant a new license to a person who** license has been revoked or
suspended if no fact or condition then exists which clearly would have
justified the administrator in refusing to grant a license.

(5) The administrator shall report to the governor and legislature on
the operation of his office, on the use of credit in the state, and on the
problem! of persons of small means obtaining credit from persons regularly
engaged in extending aales or loan credit. For the purpose of making the
report, the administrator is authorired to conduct ro>cnrch and make appropriate studies The report shall include a description of the examination
and investigation procedures and policies of his otter, a statement of policies
followed in deciding whether to investigate or examine the offices of credit
•nppliers subject to this act, a statement of the number and percentages of
offices which are periodically investigated or examined, a statement of the
types of consumer credit problem* of both creditors and debtors which
have come to his attention through his examinations and investigations and
the disposition of them under existing law, a statement of the extent to
which the rules of the administrator pursuant to this act are not in harmony
with the regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System pursuant to the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act
or tl.e rules of administrators in other jurisdictions which ena^t the Uniform Consumer Credit Code and the reasons for such variations, and a
general statement of the activities of his office arid of others to promote the
purposes of this act. The report shall not identify the creditors against
whom action is Uken by the administrator.

70B-6109. Assurance of discontinuance—If it is claimed that a person
has engag.-d in conduct subject to an order by the administrator (section
70B-G-10*; or by a court (sections 70P.-C1W through 7UlM>-nL\, the
administrator ma'y accept an .assurance in writing that the person will n-t
engage in the conduct in tire future. If a person giving an assurance of
discontinuance fails to comply with its terms, the assurance is evidence
that prior to the assurance he engaged in the conduct described in the
assurance.

for other appropriate relief.

78-12-25. Within four years.
Within four years:
(1) an action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon
an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares and
merchandise, and for any article charged in a store account; also on an
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished;
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last
payment is received.
(2) an action for relief not otherwise provided for by law.

7&-12-26. Within three years.—Within three years:
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property;
provided, that when waste or trespass is committed by means of underground works upon any mining claim, the cause of action shall not be
deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the
facts constituting such waste or trespass.
(2) An action for taking, detainbg or injuring personal property,
including actions for specific recovery thereof; provided, that in all casea
where the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in
the term "livestock," having upon it at the time of its loss a recorded
mark or brand, if such animal had strayed or was stolen from the true
owner without his fault, the cause shall not be deemed to have accrued
until the owner has actual knowledge of such facts as would put a
reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession thereof by the defendant.
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; but the
cause of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until
the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud
or mistake.
(4) An action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other
than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this

7&-12-28. Within two yean .—Within two years:
(1) An action against a marshal, sheriff, constable or other officer npon
a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his official capacity, and in
Tirtne of his office, or by the omission of an official doty, inclnding the
nonpayment of money collected npon an execution; bnt this section shall
notapply to an action for an escape.
(2) An action to recover damages for the death of one caused by the
wrongful act or neglect of another.

78-12-29. Within one year.
Within one year:
(1) an action for liability created by the statutes of a foreign state.
(2) an action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture where the action
is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except when
the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.
(3) an action upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a criminal
action, for a forfeiture or penalty to the state.
(4) an action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment or
seduction.
(5) an action against a sheriff or other officer for the escape of a prisoner arrested or imprisoned upon either civil or criminal process.
(6) an action against a municipal corporation for damages or injuries to
property caused by a mob or riot.

